TY - GEN
T1 - Analysis of authentication and key establishment in inter-generational mobile telephony
AU - Tang, Chunyu
AU - Naumann, David A.
AU - Wetzel, Susanne
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Second (GSM), third (UMTS), and fourth-generation (LTE) mobile telephony protocols are all in active use, giving rise to a number of interoperation situations. Although the standards address roaming by specifying switching and mapping of established security context, there is not a comprehensive specification of which are the possible interoperation cases. Nor is there comprehensive specification of the procedures to establish security context (authentication and short-term keys) in the various interoperation scenarios. This paper systematically enumerates the cases, classifying them as allowed, disallowed, or uncertain with rationale based on detailed analysis of the specifications. We identify the authentication and key agreement procedure for each of the possible cases. We formally model these scenarios and analyze their security, in the symbolic model, using the tool Prove if. We find two scenarios that inherit a known false base station attack. We find an attack on the CMC message of another scenario.
AB - Second (GSM), third (UMTS), and fourth-generation (LTE) mobile telephony protocols are all in active use, giving rise to a number of interoperation situations. Although the standards address roaming by specifying switching and mapping of established security context, there is not a comprehensive specification of which are the possible interoperation cases. Nor is there comprehensive specification of the procedures to establish security context (authentication and short-term keys) in the various interoperation scenarios. This paper systematically enumerates the cases, classifying them as allowed, disallowed, or uncertain with rationale based on detailed analysis of the specifications. We identify the authentication and key agreement procedure for each of the possible cases. We formally model these scenarios and analyze their security, in the symbolic model, using the tool Prove if. We find two scenarios that inherit a known false base station attack. We find an attack on the CMC message of another scenario.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84903973684&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84903973684&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/HPCC.and.EUC.2013.226
DO - 10.1109/HPCC.and.EUC.2013.226
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84903973684
SN - 9780769550886
T3 - Proceedings - 2013 IEEE International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications, HPCC 2013 and 2013 IEEE International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, EUC 2013
SP - 1605
EP - 1614
BT - Proceedings - 2013 IEEE International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications, HPCC 2013 and 2013 IEEE International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, EUC 2013
T2 - 15th IEEE International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications, HPCC 2013 and 11th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, EUC 2013
Y2 - 13 November 2013 through 15 November 2013
ER -