TY - JOUR
T1 - Banks as firms' blockholders
T2 - A study in Spain
AU - Giné, Josep A.Tribó
AU - Martínez, María José Casasola
PY - 2010/3
Y1 - 2010/3
N2 - This article analyses how a firm's returns are affected when a bank becomes a large blockholder. We investigate this issue by taking into consideration the types of blockholders that build coalitions with banks in order to control a firm. We find that the effect on a firm's returns is negative when a bank buys the largest stake and forms coalitions with other banks. However, this negative effect does not apply in other situations. We underscore our theoretical conjectures based on an empirical analysis of a panel dataset comprising a representative sample of listed and unlisted Spanish firms over the period 1996 to 2000.
AB - This article analyses how a firm's returns are affected when a bank becomes a large blockholder. We investigate this issue by taking into consideration the types of blockholders that build coalitions with banks in order to control a firm. We find that the effect on a firm's returns is negative when a bank buys the largest stake and forms coalitions with other banks. However, this negative effect does not apply in other situations. We underscore our theoretical conjectures based on an empirical analysis of a panel dataset comprising a representative sample of listed and unlisted Spanish firms over the period 1996 to 2000.
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U2 - 10.1080/09603100903459758
DO - 10.1080/09603100903459758
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:76549083196
SN - 0960-3107
VL - 20
SP - 425
EP - 438
JO - Applied Financial Economics
JF - Applied Financial Economics
IS - 5
ER -