TY - JOUR
T1 - Chain of Values
T2 - Examining the Economic Impacts of Blockchain on the Value-Added Tax System
AU - Cho, Soohyun
AU - Lee, Kyungha
AU - Cheong, Arion
AU - No, Won Gyun
AU - Vasarhelyi, Miklos A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Blockchain technology can benefit inter-organizational activities by improving data integrity, increasing transaction transparency, and decreasing transaction costs. In this paper, we discuss the strategic and economic value of this technology by applying it to the value-added tax (VAT) reporting system, focusing on blockchain’s characteristic traceability. By effectively increasing financial transparency, the application of blockchain to the VAT system can prevent VAT-related fraud (e.g., underreported VAT) that can arise due to the information asymmetry that exists at different stages of the supply chain. We develop a game theoretical model that involves a retailer and two vendors in order to study the players’ strategic decisions regarding blockchain adoption and to examine the effects on social welfare. We also show how the decision to adopt blockchain depends on considerations such as adoption costs, the vendors’ VAT reporting behavior, the retailer’s profit margins, and inter-vendor competition. Furthermore, we find that under certain conditions, policymakers can increase social welfare by providing subsidies to encourage blockchain adoption.88.
AB - Blockchain technology can benefit inter-organizational activities by improving data integrity, increasing transaction transparency, and decreasing transaction costs. In this paper, we discuss the strategic and economic value of this technology by applying it to the value-added tax (VAT) reporting system, focusing on blockchain’s characteristic traceability. By effectively increasing financial transparency, the application of blockchain to the VAT system can prevent VAT-related fraud (e.g., underreported VAT) that can arise due to the information asymmetry that exists at different stages of the supply chain. We develop a game theoretical model that involves a retailer and two vendors in order to study the players’ strategic decisions regarding blockchain adoption and to examine the effects on social welfare. We also show how the decision to adopt blockchain depends on considerations such as adoption costs, the vendors’ VAT reporting behavior, the retailer’s profit margins, and inter-vendor competition. Furthermore, we find that under certain conditions, policymakers can increase social welfare by providing subsidies to encourage blockchain adoption.88.
KW - Blockchain
KW - VAT
KW - blockchain impacts
KW - game theoretical model
KW - social welfare
KW - strategic financial transparency
KW - value-added tax
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85112664745&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1080/07421222.2021.1912912
DO - 10.1080/07421222.2021.1912912
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85112664745
SN - 0742-1222
VL - 38
SP - 288
EP - 313
JO - Journal of Management Information Systems
JF - Journal of Management Information Systems
IS - 2
ER -