TY - JOUR
T1 - Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy - A discrete simultaneous game
AU - Zhang, Chi
AU - Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel
AU - Wang, Jianhui
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
PY - 2015/4/1
Y1 - 2015/4/1
N2 - In this research, critical infrastructure protection against intentional attacks is modeled as a discrete simultaneous game between the protector and the attacker, to model the situation that both players keep the information of their resource allocation secret. We prove that keeping the information regarding protection strategies secret can obtain a better effect of critical infrastructure protection than truthfully disclosing it. Solving a game theoretic problem, even in the case of two players, has been known to be intractable. To deal with this complexity, after proving that pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solutions do not exist for the proposed simultaneous game, a new approach is proposed to identify its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium solution.
AB - In this research, critical infrastructure protection against intentional attacks is modeled as a discrete simultaneous game between the protector and the attacker, to model the situation that both players keep the information of their resource allocation secret. We prove that keeping the information regarding protection strategies secret can obtain a better effect of critical infrastructure protection than truthfully disclosing it. Solving a game theoretic problem, even in the case of two players, has been known to be intractable. To deal with this complexity, after proving that pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solutions do not exist for the proposed simultaneous game, a new approach is proposed to identify its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium solution.
KW - Critical infrastructure protection
KW - Information
KW - Intentional attack
KW - Secrecy
KW - Simultaneous game
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U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.10.001
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.10.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84920730055
SN - 0377-2217
VL - 242
SP - 212
EP - 221
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
IS - 1
ER -