Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy - A discrete simultaneous game

Chi Zhang, José Emmanuel Ramirez-Marquez, Jianhui Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

49 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this research, critical infrastructure protection against intentional attacks is modeled as a discrete simultaneous game between the protector and the attacker, to model the situation that both players keep the information of their resource allocation secret. We prove that keeping the information regarding protection strategies secret can obtain a better effect of critical infrastructure protection than truthfully disclosing it. Solving a game theoretic problem, even in the case of two players, has been known to be intractable. To deal with this complexity, after proving that pure-strategy Nash equilibrium solutions do not exist for the proposed simultaneous game, a new approach is proposed to identify its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium solution.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)212-221
Number of pages10
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume242
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2015

Keywords

  • Critical infrastructure protection
  • Information
  • Intentional attack
  • Secrecy
  • Simultaneous game

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