Detectability of Intermittent Zero-Dynamics Attack in Networked Control Systems

Yanbing Mao, Hamidreza Jafarnejadsani, Pan Zhao, Emrah Akyol, Naira Hovakimyan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be detected via conventional detection methods. A natural defense strategy builds on changing the null-space via switching through a set of topologies. In this paper, we propose a realistic ZDA variation where the attacker is aware of this topology-switching strategy, and hence employs the policy to avoid detection: pause (update and resume) attack before (after) topology switching to evade detection. We first systematically study the proposed ZDA variation, and then develop defense strategies under the realistic assumptions. Particularly, we characterize conditions for detectability of the proposed ZDA variation, in terms of the network topologies to be maintained, the set of agents to be monitored, and the measurements of the monitored agents that should be extracted. We provide numerical results that demonstrate our theoretical findings.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2019
Pages5605-5610
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781728113982
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2019
Event58th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2019 - Nice, France
Duration: 11 Dec 201913 Dec 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2019-December
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370

Conference

Conference58th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2019
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityNice
Period11/12/1913/12/19

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