Abstract
This paper explores how firms finance their R&D projects. There are several instruments that can be used, however, due to information asymmetries and the combination of tangible and intangible returns that R&D projects generate, debt-financing is the worst alternative. The novelty of this paper is that it combines aspects of the resource-based view with those of the agency theory. This, in terms of a firm's decision making, is to consider that a firm's R&D investment is, on the one hand, partly determined by its financing resources and, on the other hand, a major determinant of its financial structure. The theoretical hypotheses are supported in the empirical study that makes use of a data sample of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1991-99. The main implication for managers that can be extracted from our study is that the most powerful financing incentive mechanism to stimulate R&D effort is to follow a deep pocket policy of internal funds accumulation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 191-202 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Corporate Ownership and Control |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue number | 2 B |
| State | Published - 2005 |
Keywords
- Agency theory
- Financing instruments
- R&D investment
- Resource-based view