TY - GEN
T1 - Human society inspired dynamic spectrum access networks
T2 - 54th Annual IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference: "Energizing Global Communications", GLOBECOM 2011
AU - Tan, Yi
AU - Sengupta, Shamik
AU - Subbalakshmi, K. P.
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - In this paper, we investigate the parochialism in dynamic spectrum access networks and its effect on spectrum resource competition and self-coexistence among cognitive radio secondary users. We assume that some greedy secondary users in the network form a parochial community in private and try to maximize their own utilities without concern for the interests of other secondary users outside the community. A noncooperative game is formulated first to analyze the equilibrium strategy of secondary users without any parochial community in the network. In the scenario where there is a parochial community, we analyze the expected payoff for the insider secondary users who deviate from the Nash equilibrium and derive the optimal strategy for them. Through numerical analysis, we see how the optimal strategies for the secondary users inside the parochial community in different circumstances deviate from Nash equilibrium. Simulation results demonstrate that being a part of the parochial community, the secondary users can obtain more utility than the outsider secondary users and the system will change from an equilibrium to an unfair situation.
AB - In this paper, we investigate the parochialism in dynamic spectrum access networks and its effect on spectrum resource competition and self-coexistence among cognitive radio secondary users. We assume that some greedy secondary users in the network form a parochial community in private and try to maximize their own utilities without concern for the interests of other secondary users outside the community. A noncooperative game is formulated first to analyze the equilibrium strategy of secondary users without any parochial community in the network. In the scenario where there is a parochial community, we analyze the expected payoff for the insider secondary users who deviate from the Nash equilibrium and derive the optimal strategy for them. Through numerical analysis, we see how the optimal strategies for the secondary users inside the parochial community in different circumstances deviate from Nash equilibrium. Simulation results demonstrate that being a part of the parochial community, the secondary users can obtain more utility than the outsider secondary users and the system will change from an equilibrium to an unfair situation.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84857225827&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84857225827&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134062
DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6134062
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84857225827
SN - 9781424492688
T3 - GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
BT - 2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2011
Y2 - 5 December 2011 through 9 December 2011
ER -