TY - JOUR
T1 - Incentive design for commercial participation in space logistics infrastructure development and deployment
AU - Chen, Hao
AU - Ornik, Melkior
AU - Ho, Koki
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2019 by the International Astronautical Federation (IAF). All rights reserved.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The development and deployment of public space infrastructures, such as lunar habitat systems, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) systems, and propellant depots, often require a large amount of initial investment that may not be affordable by a single stakeholder. It often requires global collaborations and federations of different governmental agencies and commercial entities. To analyze the interactions of stakeholders with different mission objectives and to stimulate commercial participation in future space infrastructure development and deployment, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism design framework based on game theory. An analytical incentive design method based on the Nash bargaining solution is established. We prove that this method can minimize the incentive required for commercial participation while maximizing both the social welfare (i.e., maximizing the total utility of all stakeholders) and the fairness (i.e., maximizing the minimum utility of each stakeholder). A case study on lunar habitat infrastructure deployment is implemented to demonstrate and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive design method. Results also show how the performances of ISRU system after deployment may impact the cooperation among stakeholders.
AB - The development and deployment of public space infrastructures, such as lunar habitat systems, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) systems, and propellant depots, often require a large amount of initial investment that may not be affordable by a single stakeholder. It often requires global collaborations and federations of different governmental agencies and commercial entities. To analyze the interactions of stakeholders with different mission objectives and to stimulate commercial participation in future space infrastructure development and deployment, this paper proposes an incentive mechanism design framework based on game theory. An analytical incentive design method based on the Nash bargaining solution is established. We prove that this method can minimize the incentive required for commercial participation while maximizing both the social welfare (i.e., maximizing the total utility of all stakeholders) and the fairness (i.e., maximizing the minimum utility of each stakeholder). A case study on lunar habitat infrastructure deployment is implemented to demonstrate and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive design method. Results also show how the performances of ISRU system after deployment may impact the cooperation among stakeholders.
KW - Game Theory
KW - Incentive Design
KW - Space Infrastructure
KW - Space Logistics
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M3 - Conference article
AN - SCOPUS:85079131944
SN - 0074-1795
VL - 2019-October
JO - Proceedings of the International Astronautical Congress, IAC
JF - Proceedings of the International Astronautical Congress, IAC
M1 - IAC-19_D3_1_6_x51353
T2 - 70th International Astronautical Congress, IAC 2019
Y2 - 21 October 2019 through 25 October 2019
ER -