Information flow monitor inlining

Andrey Chudnov, David A. Naumann

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

51 Scopus citations

Abstract

In recent years it has been shown that dynamic monitoring can be used to soundly enforce information flow policies. For programs distributed in source or bytecode form, the use of just-in-time (JIT) compilation makes it difficult to implement monitoring by modifying the language runtime system. An inliner avoids this problem and also serves to provide monitoring for more than one runtime. We show how to inline an information flow monitor, specifically a flow sensitive one previously proved to enforce termination insensitive noninterference. We prove that the inlined version is observationally equivalent to the original.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2010
Pages200-214
Number of pages15
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event23rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2010 - Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Duration: 17 Jul 201019 Jul 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
ISSN (Print)1940-1434

Conference

Conference23rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityEdinburgh
Period17/07/1019/07/10

Keywords

  • Information flow
  • Information security
  • Program transformation
  • Reference monitors

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