@inproceedings{f472aa6f14c54e4ca636e520274b8183,
title = "LAMA: Leakage Abuse Attacks Against Microsoft Always Encrypted",
abstract = "Always Encrypted (AE) is a Microsoft SQL Server feature that allows clients to encrypt sensitive data inside client applications and ensures that the sensitive data is hidden from untrusted servers and database administrators. AE offers two column-encryption options: deterministic encryption (DET) and randomized encryption (RND). In this paper, we explore the security implications of using AE with both DET and RND encryption modes by running Leakage Abuse Attacks (LAAs) against the system. We demonstrate how an adversary could extract the necessary data to run a frequency analysis LAA against DET-encrypted columns and an LAA for Order-Revealing Encryption against RND-encrypted columns. We run our attacks using real-world datasets encrypted in a full-scale AE instancer and demonstrate that a snooping server can recovers over 95\% of the rows in 8 out of 15 DET-encrypted columns, and 10 out of 15 RND-encrypted columns.",
keywords = "Attack, Cryptography, Database Management, Encrypted Search, Leakage Abuse Attack, Microsoft SQL",
author = "Ryan Seah and Daren Khu and Alexander Hoover and Ruth Ng",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2024 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda.; 21st International Conference on Security and Cryptography, SECRYPT 2024 ; Conference date: 08-07-2024 Through 10-07-2024",
year = "2024",
doi = "10.5220/0012714800003767",
language = "English",
series = "Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography",
publisher = "Science and Technology Publications, Lda",
pages = "628--633",
editor = "\{Di Vimercati\}, \{Sabrina De Capitani\} and Pierangela Samarati",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Security and Cryptography, SECRYPT 2024",
address = "Portugal",
}