Locating and protecting facilities from intentional attacks using secrecy

Chi Zhang, José Emmanuel Ramirez-Marquez, Qing Li

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    30 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    To preserve continued effective performance of facilities, their protection against intentional attacks needs to be considered while determining optimal facility location solutions. We propose a simultaneous game between a defender and an attacker to study facility protection against intentional attacks while keeping the information about protection resource allocation secret. To deal with the complexity of solving the proposed simultaneous game, we employ an algorithm with necessary adaptations to identify its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium solution, which is used to evaluate the disruption inflicted by intentional attacks on the efficiency of a facility location solution. The facility location problem with protection against intentional attacks is then modeled as a multi-objective optimization problem, in order to balance the cost of opening facilities and the efficiency of facilities with and without facility failures inflicted by intentional attacks. MO-PSDA, a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm, is employed to solve the proposed multi-objective optimization problem.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)51-62
    Number of pages12
    JournalReliability Engineering and System Safety
    Volume169
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 2018

    Keywords

    • Facility location
    • Intentional attacks
    • Multi-objective optimization
    • Secrecy
    • Simultaneous game

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