TY - JOUR
T1 - Modeling the impact of disinformation on infrastructure networks
T2 - A node-to-path causal failure approach across interconnected layers
AU - Nanyanzi, Alice
AU - Barker, Kash
AU - Radhakrishnan, Sridhar
AU - Zhang, Zuyuan
AU - Ramirez-Marquez, Jose
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 Elsevier Ltd.
PY - 2026/4
Y1 - 2026/4
N2 - The widespread dissemination of disinformation poses a serious threat to society, particularly if such disinformation is weaponized to target critical infrastructure. By conceptualizing the spread of disinformation as a dynamic process on one network layer (denoted as A ) and the physical infrastructure network as another (denoted as B ), we can observe the indirect impacts of the failure of the components in A on the components in B . For example, false messages about potential power rate hikes or outages (in A ) can manipulate consumer behavior, resulting in increased power demand that might overload transmission lines, ultimately leading to blackouts (manifesting as disruptions in B ). Such disruptions highlight the interconnected vulnerabilities between disinformation dissemination and critical infrastructure. Unlike previous studies that broadly examine interdependencies between networks, our approach captures direct cause-and-effect relationships. We model these relationships across layers using the concept of causal failures. Specifically, we formally define causal failures across both layers and introduce the concept of stochastic causal failure, where the probability of a node-to-path failure relationship is influenced by stochastic processes. We then propose a problem to study these stochastic causalities, focusing on how the failure of a node in layer A stochastically impacts the failure of a path in layer B . To address this, we develop an algorithm to determine the maximum number of stochastic causalities in A needed to create a giant component of a specified size in B . Furthermore, we present another algorithm that calculates the minimum number of stochastic causal failures in A required to generate at least k small connected components in B . Our experiments examine how the spread of disinformation in layer A can activate causalities, leading to stochastic failures in the infrastructure layer B , which we model with data describing social media and power networks.
AB - The widespread dissemination of disinformation poses a serious threat to society, particularly if such disinformation is weaponized to target critical infrastructure. By conceptualizing the spread of disinformation as a dynamic process on one network layer (denoted as A ) and the physical infrastructure network as another (denoted as B ), we can observe the indirect impacts of the failure of the components in A on the components in B . For example, false messages about potential power rate hikes or outages (in A ) can manipulate consumer behavior, resulting in increased power demand that might overload transmission lines, ultimately leading to blackouts (manifesting as disruptions in B ). Such disruptions highlight the interconnected vulnerabilities between disinformation dissemination and critical infrastructure. Unlike previous studies that broadly examine interdependencies between networks, our approach captures direct cause-and-effect relationships. We model these relationships across layers using the concept of causal failures. Specifically, we formally define causal failures across both layers and introduce the concept of stochastic causal failure, where the probability of a node-to-path failure relationship is influenced by stochastic processes. We then propose a problem to study these stochastic causalities, focusing on how the failure of a node in layer A stochastically impacts the failure of a path in layer B . To address this, we develop an algorithm to determine the maximum number of stochastic causalities in A needed to create a giant component of a specified size in B . Furthermore, we present another algorithm that calculates the minimum number of stochastic causal failures in A required to generate at least k small connected components in B . Our experiments examine how the spread of disinformation in layer A can activate causalities, leading to stochastic failures in the infrastructure layer B , which we model with data describing social media and power networks.
KW - Connectivity
KW - Disinformation
KW - Giant component
KW - Multilayer networks
KW - Robustness
KW - Small connected components
KW - Stochastic causal failures
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105023587816
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105023587816#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1016/j.ress.2025.112021
DO - 10.1016/j.ress.2025.112021
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105023587816
SN - 0951-8320
VL - 268
JO - Reliability Engineering and System Safety
JF - Reliability Engineering and System Safety
M1 - 112021
ER -