TY - JOUR
T1 - Multi-Lateral Participants Decision-Making
T2 - A Distribution System Planning Approach with Incomplete Information Game
AU - Liu, Yi
AU - Yang, Nan
AU - Dong, Bangtian
AU - Wu, Lei
AU - Yan, Jing
AU - Shen, Xun
AU - Xing, Chao
AU - Liu, Songkai
AU - Huang, Yuehua
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 IEEE.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Competition on distributed generation (DG) investments among multiple stakeholders in a distribution system results in incompleteness of market information, in which each stakeholder does not have full knowledge on investment and operation decisions of other participants. It leads to an incomplete information game among multiple stakeholders. This paper discusses a multi-lateral incomplete information game based approach to study distribution system planning while considering both supply and demand sides competitions. Profit models of three types of stakeholders, including DG investors (i.e., DG units are investor-owned), electricity consumers, and the distribution company, are constructed. The interaction among the stakeholders and their gaming behavior are further studied under the context of multi-lateral incomplete information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium form of the multi-lateral incomplete information game is obtained via Harsanyi transformation. An improved co-evolutionary algorithm is adopted to find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Simulation results on a modified IEEE 33-bus test system show that, compared with the complete information game method, the proposed approach presents higher expected profits and more accurate planning schemes. Indeed, the proposed approach reflects the realistic planning process of distribution systems under a deregulated competitive environment, and it ensures fairness of competition among self-interested independent stakeholders while guaranteeing their individual performance.
AB - Competition on distributed generation (DG) investments among multiple stakeholders in a distribution system results in incompleteness of market information, in which each stakeholder does not have full knowledge on investment and operation decisions of other participants. It leads to an incomplete information game among multiple stakeholders. This paper discusses a multi-lateral incomplete information game based approach to study distribution system planning while considering both supply and demand sides competitions. Profit models of three types of stakeholders, including DG investors (i.e., DG units are investor-owned), electricity consumers, and the distribution company, are constructed. The interaction among the stakeholders and their gaming behavior are further studied under the context of multi-lateral incomplete information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium form of the multi-lateral incomplete information game is obtained via Harsanyi transformation. An improved co-evolutionary algorithm is adopted to find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Simulation results on a modified IEEE 33-bus test system show that, compared with the complete information game method, the proposed approach presents higher expected profits and more accurate planning schemes. Indeed, the proposed approach reflects the realistic planning process of distribution systems under a deregulated competitive environment, and it ensures fairness of competition among self-interested independent stakeholders while guaranteeing their individual performance.
KW - Bayesian Nash equilibrium
KW - Distribution system planning
KW - Harsanyi transformation
KW - co-evolutionary algorithm
KW - multi-lateral incomplete information game
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U2 - 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2991181
DO - 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2991181
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85086139289
VL - 8
SP - 88933
EP - 88950
JO - IEEE Access
JF - IEEE Access
M1 - 9081909
ER -