TY - JOUR
T1 - Ownership structure and minority expropriation
T2 - The case for multiple blockholders
AU - Gutiérrez, María
AU - Tribó, Josep A.
AU - Mariano, Beatriz
PY - 2012/12
Y1 - 2012/12
N2 - This article investigates minority expropriation in closely-held firms. Using a sample of Spanish firms for the period from 1996 to 2006, we find that firms that are more vulnerable to minority expropriation have blockholders controlling groups with aggregate equity stakes that are far removed from 50%, which is the point that maximizes the chances of expropriation. Moreover, performance improves when the controlling group's stake moves away from the region where expropriation is more likely - the alignment effect - and, if within this region, when the number of group members increases - the bargaining effect.
AB - This article investigates minority expropriation in closely-held firms. Using a sample of Spanish firms for the period from 1996 to 2006, we find that firms that are more vulnerable to minority expropriation have blockholders controlling groups with aggregate equity stakes that are far removed from 50%, which is the point that maximizes the chances of expropriation. Moreover, performance improves when the controlling group's stake moves away from the region where expropriation is more likely - the alignment effect - and, if within this region, when the number of group members increases - the bargaining effect.
KW - controlling group
KW - minority expropriation
KW - multiple blockholders
KW - ownership structure
KW - performance
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84863834542&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84863834542&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09603107.2012.697119
DO - 10.1080/09603107.2012.697119
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84863834542
SN - 0960-3107
VL - 22
SP - 2075
EP - 2083
JO - Applied Financial Economics
JF - Applied Financial Economics
IS - 24
ER -