TY - GEN
T1 - Privacy-enhancing auctions using rational cryptography
AU - Miltersen, Peter Bro
AU - Nielsen, Jesper Buus
AU - Triandopoulos, Nikos
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - We consider enhancing with privacy concerns a large class of auctions, which include sealed-bid single-item auctions but also general multi-item multi-winner auctions, our assumption being that bidders primarily care about monetary payoff and secondarily worry about exposing information about their type to other players and learning information about other players' types, that is, bidders are greedy then paranoid. To treat privacy explicitly within the game theoretic context, we put forward a novel hybrid utility model that considers both monetary and privacy components in players' payoffs. We show how to use rational cryptography to approximately implement any given ex interim individually strictly rational equilibrium of such an auction without a trusted mediator through a cryptographic protocol that uses only point-to-point authenticated channels between the players. By "ex interim individually strictly rational" we mean that, given its type and before making its move, each player has a strictly positive expected utility. By "approximately implement" we mean that, under cryptographic assumptions, running the protocol is a computational Nash equilibrium with a payoff profile negligibly close to the original equilibrium.
AB - We consider enhancing with privacy concerns a large class of auctions, which include sealed-bid single-item auctions but also general multi-item multi-winner auctions, our assumption being that bidders primarily care about monetary payoff and secondarily worry about exposing information about their type to other players and learning information about other players' types, that is, bidders are greedy then paranoid. To treat privacy explicitly within the game theoretic context, we put forward a novel hybrid utility model that considers both monetary and privacy components in players' payoffs. We show how to use rational cryptography to approximately implement any given ex interim individually strictly rational equilibrium of such an auction without a trusted mediator through a cryptographic protocol that uses only point-to-point authenticated channels between the players. By "ex interim individually strictly rational" we mean that, given its type and before making its move, each player has a strictly positive expected utility. By "approximately implement" we mean that, under cryptographic assumptions, running the protocol is a computational Nash equilibrium with a payoff profile negligibly close to the original equilibrium.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_32
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_32
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:70350342512
SN - 3642033555
SN - 9783642033551
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 541
EP - 558
BT - Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009 - 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
T2 - 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2009
Y2 - 16 August 2009 through 20 August 2009
ER -