TY - JOUR
T1 - Protecting critical infrastructures against intentional attacks
T2 - A two-stage game with incomplete information
AU - Zhang, Chi
AU - Ramirez-Marquez, Jose Emmanuel
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - It is now paramount to protect critical infrastructures because of their significance for economic development and social well-being of modern societies. One of the main threats to these networked systems is from intentional attackers, who are resourceful and inventive in selecting time, target, and means of attack. Thus, attackers' intelligence should be considered when developing intelligent and cost-effective protection strategies. In this research, critical infrastructures are modeled as networks and the development of network protection strategies ismodeled as a two-stage game between a protector and an attacker with incomplete information. Due to the complexity of critical infrastructures, there are usually a large number of combinations of potential protection and attack strategies leading to a computational challenge to find the Pareto equilibrium solutions for the proposed game. To meet this challenge, this research develops an evolutionary algorithm to solve the proposed a transformation of the game into a multi-objective optimization model.
AB - It is now paramount to protect critical infrastructures because of their significance for economic development and social well-being of modern societies. One of the main threats to these networked systems is from intentional attackers, who are resourceful and inventive in selecting time, target, and means of attack. Thus, attackers' intelligence should be considered when developing intelligent and cost-effective protection strategies. In this research, critical infrastructures are modeled as networks and the development of network protection strategies ismodeled as a two-stage game between a protector and an attacker with incomplete information. Due to the complexity of critical infrastructures, there are usually a large number of combinations of potential protection and attack strategies leading to a computational challenge to find the Pareto equilibrium solutions for the proposed game. To meet this challenge, this research develops an evolutionary algorithm to solve the proposed a transformation of the game into a multi-objective optimization model.
KW - Critical infrastructure protection
KW - Incomplete information
KW - Intentional attack
KW - Multi-objective optimization
KW - Pareto equilibrium
KW - Two-stage game
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U2 - 10.1080/0740817X.2012.676749
DO - 10.1080/0740817X.2012.676749
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84877791532
SN - 0740-817X
VL - 45
SP - 244
EP - 258
JO - IIE Transactions (Institute of Industrial Engineers)
JF - IIE Transactions (Institute of Industrial Engineers)
IS - 3
ER -