Protecting sink location against global traffic monitoring attacker

Juan Chen, Zhengkui Lin, Xiaojiang Du

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

As the central point of failure, sink location protection is critical to the viability of the whole sensor network. However, existing work related to sink location protection only focuses on local traffic analysis attack. In this paper, we examine the sink location protection problem under a more powerful attack, the global traffic monitoring attack for the first time. In order to hide the sink location, a scheme based on packet sending rate adjustment (SRA) is proposed. By controlling the packet sending rate of each node according to the current number of source nodes, SRA conceals the real traffic volume generated by new source nodes and hence disguises the location of the sink. Theory analysis shows that SRA can protect the sink location against global traffic analysis attack effectively. Simulation results demonstrate that SRA has low communication cost and acceptable end-to-end latency.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2016 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, ICNC 2016
ISBN (Electronic)9781467385794
DOIs
StatePublished - 23 Mar 2016
EventInternational Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, ICNC 2016 - Kauai, United States
Duration: 15 Feb 201618 Feb 2016

Publication series

Name2016 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, ICNC 2016

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, ICNC 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityKauai
Period15/02/1618/02/16

Keywords

  • global traffic attacker
  • location privacy preservation
  • sink location
  • wireless sensor networks

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