Regulatory reforms, board independence and earnings quality

Qazi Awais Amin; Douglas Cumming

doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101840

Regulatory reforms, board independence and earnings quality

Qazi Awais Amin
, Douglas Cumming

School of Business

Nottingham Trent University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate the exogenous increase in the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in response to the corporate governance regulations 2012 in Singapore and Vietnam to estimate the effectiveness of INEDs in restraining earnings management. We also investigate the moderating effect of two important characteristics of INEDs: education and tenure on the relationship between regulations 2012 and earnings management. Our core findings show that voluntary adopters with better INEDs education and optimal tenure experience a significant decrease in earnings management compared to mandatory adopters with lower of INEDseducation and suboptimal tenure.

Original language	English
Article number	101840
Journal	Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Volume	88
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101840
State	Published - Oct 2023

Keywords

Board education
Board independence
Board tenure
Corporate governance regulations
Earnings management

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10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101840

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title = "Regulatory reforms, board independence and earnings quality",

abstract = "We investigate the exogenous increase in the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in response to the corporate governance regulations 2012 in Singapore and Vietnam to estimate the effectiveness of INEDs in restraining earnings management. We also investigate the moderating effect of two important characteristics of INEDs: education and tenure on the relationship between regulations 2012 and earnings management. Our core findings show that voluntary adopters with better INEDs education and optimal tenure experience a significant decrease in earnings management compared to mandatory adopters with lower of INEDseducation and suboptimal tenure.",

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author = "\{Awais Amin\}, Qazi and Douglas Cumming",

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year = "2023",

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doi = "10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101840",

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AU - Cumming, Douglas

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AB - We investigate the exogenous increase in the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in response to the corporate governance regulations 2012 in Singapore and Vietnam to estimate the effectiveness of INEDs in restraining earnings management. We also investigate the moderating effect of two important characteristics of INEDs: education and tenure on the relationship between regulations 2012 and earnings management. Our core findings show that voluntary adopters with better INEDs education and optimal tenure experience a significant decrease in earnings management compared to mandatory adopters with lower of INEDseducation and suboptimal tenure.

KW - Board education

KW - Board independence

KW - Board tenure

KW - Corporate governance regulations

KW - Earnings management

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85172351200

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85172351200#tab=citedBy

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DO - 10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101840

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VL - 88

JO - Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money

JF - Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money

M1 - 101840

ER -

Regulatory reforms, board independence and earnings quality

Abstract

Keywords

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