TY - GEN
T1 - ShrinkWrap
T2 - 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2015
AU - Haller, Istvan
AU - Göktąs, Enes
AU - Athanasopoulos, Elias
AU - Portokalidis, Georgios
AU - Bos, Herbert
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 ACM.
PY - 2015/12/7
Y1 - 2015/12/7
N2 - As VTable hijacking becomes the primary mode of exploitation against modern browsers, protecting said VTables has recently become a prime research interest. While multiple source- And binary-based solutions for protecting VTables have been proposed already, we found that in practice they are too conservative, which allows determined attackers to circumvent them. In this paper we delve into the design of C++ VTables and match that knowledge against the now industry standard protection scheme of VTV. We propose an end-to-end design that significantly refines VTV, to offer a provably optimal protection scheme. As we build on top of VTV, we preserve all of its advantages in terms of software compatibility and overhead. Thus, our proposed design comes "for free" for any user today. Besides the design we propose a testing methodology, which can be used by future developers to validate their implementations. We evaluated our protection scheme on Google Chrome and show that no compatibility issues were introduced, while overhead is also unchanged compared to the baseline of VTV.
AB - As VTable hijacking becomes the primary mode of exploitation against modern browsers, protecting said VTables has recently become a prime research interest. While multiple source- And binary-based solutions for protecting VTables have been proposed already, we found that in practice they are too conservative, which allows determined attackers to circumvent them. In this paper we delve into the design of C++ VTables and match that knowledge against the now industry standard protection scheme of VTV. We propose an end-to-end design that significantly refines VTV, to offer a provably optimal protection scheme. As we build on top of VTV, we preserve all of its advantages in terms of software compatibility and overhead. Thus, our proposed design comes "for free" for any user today. Besides the design we propose a testing methodology, which can be used by future developers to validate their implementations. We evaluated our protection scheme on Google Chrome and show that no compatibility issues were introduced, while overhead is also unchanged compared to the baseline of VTV.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84959346014&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84959346014&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2818000.2818025
DO - 10.1145/2818000.2818025
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84959346014
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
SP - 341
EP - 350
BT - Proceedings - 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2015
Y2 - 7 December 2015 through 11 December 2015
ER -