Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system

Randal Burns; Zachary Peterson; Giuseppe Ateniese; Stephen Bono

doi:10.1145/1103780.1103787

Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system

Randal Burns, Zachary Peterson, Giuseppe Ateniese, Stephen Bono

Department of Computer Science

Johns Hopkins University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present constructs that create, manage, and verify digital audit trails for versioning file systems. Based upon a small amount of data published to a third party, a file system commits to a version history. At a later date, an auditor uses the published data to verify the contents of the file system at any point in time. Audit trails create an analog of the paper audit process for file data, helping to meet the requirements of electronic record legislation, such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Our techniques address the I/O and computational efficiency of generating and verifying audit trails, the aggregation of audit information in directory hierarchies, and constructing verifiable audit trails in the presence of lost data.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability
Editors	W. Yurcik, L. Brumbaugh, Y. Zhou
Pages	44-50
Number of pages	7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1103780.1103787
State	Published - 2005
Event	StorageSS'05 - 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability - Fairfax, VA, United States Duration: 11 Nov 2005 → 11 Nov 2005

Publication series

Name	StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability

Conference

Conference	StorageSS'05 - 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability
Country/Territory	United States
City	Fairfax, VA
Period	11/11/05 → 11/11/05

Keywords

Electronic records
Secure audit
Versioning file systems

Access to Document

10.1145/1103780.1103787

Cite this

Burns, R., Peterson, Z., Ateniese, G., & Bono, S. (2005). Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system. In W. Yurcik, L. Brumbaugh, & Y. Zhou (Eds.), StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability (pp. 44-50). (StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability). https://doi.org/10.1145/1103780.1103787

@inproceedings{861cda65aed94933a225ae8c0ac6fbd6,

title = "Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system",

abstract = "We present constructs that create, manage, and verify digital audit trails for versioning file systems. Based upon a small amount of data published to a third party, a file system commits to a version history. At a later date, an auditor uses the published data to verify the contents of the file system at any point in time. Audit trails create an analog of the paper audit process for file data, helping to meet the requirements of electronic record legislation, such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Our techniques address the I/O and computational efficiency of generating and verifying audit trails, the aggregation of audit information in directory hierarchies, and constructing verifiable audit trails in the presence of lost data.",

keywords = "Electronic records, Secure audit, Versioning file systems",

author = "Randal Burns and Zachary Peterson and Giuseppe Ateniese and Stephen Bono",

year = "2005",

doi = "10.1145/1103780.1103787",

language = "English",

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series = "StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability",

pages = "44--50",

editor = "W. Yurcik and L. Brumbaugh and Y. Zhou",

booktitle = "StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability",

note = "StorageSS'05 - 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability ; Conference date: 11-11-2005 Through 11-11-2005",

}

Burns, R, Peterson, Z, Ateniese, G & Bono, S 2005, Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system. in W Yurcik, L Brumbaugh & Y Zhou (eds), StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability. StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability, pp. 44-50, StorageSS'05 - 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability, Fairfax, VA, United States, 11/11/05. https://doi.org/10.1145/1103780.1103787

Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system. / Burns, Randal; Peterson, Zachary; Ateniese, Giuseppe et al.
StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability. ed. / W. Yurcik; L. Brumbaugh; Y. Zhou. 2005. p. 44-50 (StorageSS'05 - Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AB - We present constructs that create, manage, and verify digital audit trails for versioning file systems. Based upon a small amount of data published to a third party, a file system commits to a version history. At a later date, an auditor uses the published data to verify the contents of the file system at any point in time. Audit trails create an analog of the paper audit process for file data, helping to meet the requirements of electronic record legislation, such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Our techniques address the I/O and computational efficiency of generating and verifying audit trails, the aggregation of audit information in directory hierarchies, and constructing verifiable audit trails in the presence of lost data.

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Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system

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