What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments

Nick Byrd

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

The received view of implicit bias holds that it is associative and unreflective. Recently, the received view has been challenged. Some argue that implicit bias is not predicated on “any” associative process, but it is unreflective. These arguments rely, in part, on debiasing experiments. They proceed as follows. If implicit bias is associative and unreflective, then certain experimental manipulations cannot change implicitly biased behavior. However, these manipulations can change such behavior. So, implicit bias is not associative and unreflective. This paper finds philosophical and empirical problems with that argument. When the problems are solved, the conclusion is not quite right: implicit bias is not necessarily unreflective, but it seems to be associative. Further, the paper shows that even if legitimate non-associative interventions on implicit bias exist, then both the received view and its recent contender would be false. In their stead would be interactionism or minimalism about implicit bias.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1427-1455
Number of pages29
JournalSynthese
Volume198
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2021

Keywords

  • Associationism
  • Causation
  • Debiasing
  • Dual process theory
  • Implicit association test
  • Implicit bias
  • Interventionism
  • Philosophy of cognitive science
  • Philosophy of mind
  • Philosophy of science
  • Reflectivism

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